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Mass Forced Evictions and the Human Right to 
Adequate Housing in Zimbabwe 
Sean Romero * 
¶1 A formidable problem faces urban populations in developing countries today, as 
seventy-five percent “live[] in informal housing: dwellings which have been constructed 
without the required permission, without the full title to land . . . [but] provide shelter to 
1.5 billion people, or a quarter of the world’s population.”1  Zimbabwe contributes to 
these figures, and its most recent land reform program to “clean up” its cities – Operation 
Murambatsvina – has displaced over 700,000 men, woman, and children who lived in 
informal housing.2  In its aftermath, over one-hundred thousand families were rendered 
homeless.3  Though the Government of Zimbabwe, under the rule of President Robert 
Mugabe, has recognized “the right of every one to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including [] food, clothing and housing . . . .,”4 it has done little to 
comply with its international obligations and rectify the humanitarian crises now facing a 
vast sector of its population. 5   
¶2 Notwithstanding that the majority of demolished dwellings were informal housing 
settlements and therefore illegal, the Government acknowledged that it could “either 
upgrade any ‘illegal’ settlements or resettle the people on other planned residential sites 
in line with international law.”6 The Government chose neither, and issued an 
enforcement order for the Operation five days after the demolitions in the capital City of 
Harare had already begun. 7  The devastating consequences could have been minimized if 
                                                 
* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2004 B.A., cum laude, University of New 
Mexico.  I would like to thank my friends and colleagues Emily Stewart and Jen Kim for their support 
throughout the editing process.  I would especially like to thank my family for their encouragement 
throughout law school.  Comments on this piece may be sent to s-romero2007@law.northwestern.edu. 
1 THEO R.G. VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY 85 (2002).   
2 U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to 
Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina , 7, delivered to the U.N. Human 
Settlements Programme , (July 22, 2005) (Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka) available at 
http://www.unhabitat.org/documents/ZimbabweReport.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Report]. 
3 Id. at 85. 
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11(1), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (accession by Zimb. May 13, 1991) 
[hereinafter CESCR]. 
5 The U.N. Special Envoy estimates that  “the total population indirectly affected by the Operation [is] 2.56 
million.” U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 34. 
6 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “CLEAR THE FILTH”: MASS EVICTIONS AND DEMOLITIONS IN ZIMBABWE, A 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER 9 (2005), 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe0905/zimbabwe0905.pdf [hereinafter Human Rights 
Watch]. 
7 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 58.  The Operation began May 19 and the enforcement order was issued 
May 24, 2005. 
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relevant agencies had provided “genuine consultation with affected persons and groups”8 
prior to the demolitions being carried out.9  This did not happen.   
¶3 Though state-controlled newspapers have recently spun the Operation as a 
preemptive move to prevent a revolution “being planned and funded by . . . Western 
countries,” it is evident that the Government’s actions are consistent with its trend of 
“dismiss[ing] [human rights] allegations as part of a western neo-colonial conspiracy . . . 
.”10  Local non-governmental organizations (“NGO’s”) and human rights lawyers in 
Zimbabwe have reported that the Operation was largely a move to punish those who 
voted for the opposition party in March 200511 and to “prevent mass uprisings against 
deepening food insecurity and worsening economic conditions.”12  Despite the conflicting 
rhetoric, it is clear that the Government has failed to comply with domestic and 
international obligations prohibiting forced evictions, including the right to adequate 
alternative housing, access to food, water, and health care13 for the six percent of its 
population adversely affected.14 
¶4 This article analyzes the international and domestic legal doctrines implicated by 
the human rights violations arising from Operation Murambatsvina, namely the right to 
adequate alternative housing, and argues that international intervention is required to 
uphold the rule of law and assist Zimbabwe in recovery.  Section I outlines the 
Government’s alleged rationale for the Operation, as well as the context, nature, and 
humanitarian consequences of the demolitions.  Section II explores Zimbabwe’s 
international treaty obligations protecting individuals’ right to housing and prohibitions 
against forced eviction in an area of international law still under development.15  Sections 
III and IV evaluate Zimbabwe’s domestic doctrines and legal framework, and argues that 
although the Zimbabwe Constitution is informed by international human rights norms 
and Zimbabwean courts have conceded that “international law is . . . the law of 
[Zimbabwe],”16 applying its international obligations domestically is impractical because 
the judiciary has ceased functioning independently.  Section V assesses whether the 
human rights abuses resulting from the Operation have reached the level of a 
humanitarian crises that would justify direct international intervention, particularly in 
light of “the emerging norm of a [collective] responsibility to protect.”17  The article 
concludes with recommendations for international intervention in the form of assistance 
with implementing a sustainable recovery program, and a means of judicial recourse for 
the human rights abuses suffered by Zimbabweans at the hands of their government.   
                                                 
8 General Comment No. 4: The Human Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1)), Report of the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 6th Sess., at para 8(a), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1991) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 4]. 
9 Human Rights Watch, supra  note 6, at 19. 
10 Id.   
11 Id. at 14. 
12 Id. 
13 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 7, 39. The U.N. Special Envoy estimates that 79,500 people over the age of 
15 living with HIV/AIDS have been displaced, with basic HIV/AIDS services being discontinued as a 
result of the Operation. 
14 Human Rights Watch, supra  note 6, at 1. 
15 Nick Dancaescu, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 615, 638 (2003). 
16 Barker McCormack Ltd. v. Gov’t of Kenya, (1983) 2 Z.L.R. 72, 77. 
17 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Changes, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf  
[hereinafter Shared Responsibility Report]. 
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I. OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA  
A. Context of the Operation 
¶5 Since gaining independence from British colonialism in 1980, Zimbabwe has been 
governed by South African revolutionary Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe Africa 
Nationalist Union Patriotic Front (“ZANU-PF”) party.  Initially viewed by the regional 
and international community as an exemplary South African country capable of 
successfully transforming from apartheid rule to a representative democracy, Mugabe’s 
Government was soon characterized by corruption, oppression, violence, and policies of 
wealth redistribution that caused skyrocketing inflation. 18  The downward trend began in 
1990 when President Mugabe implemented hyper-aggressive land reform programs 
allowing the Government to seize white-owned farms without compensation. 19  The 
purpose of these programs was to redistribute white-owned commercial farms to native 
Zimbabweans who were formerly dispossessed and forbidden from owning property 
under the colonial regime.20  Though land redistribution was necessary to overcome the 
inequitable ratio of white to black owned land, President Mugabe and the ZANU-PF 
failed to consider that “[w]hite commercial farmers produced 90% of the country’s 
food,”21 that the farming sector was the mainstay of exports and foreign exchange, and 
provided 400,000 jobs.22  Furthermore, dependence on untrained Black farmers to 
immediately fill this void was not feasible.23 
¶6 Coupled with cash handouts to war veterans in 199724 and military intervention in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1998 to 2002,25 the “fast-track” land 
redistribution program provided the final blow from which the Zimbabwean economy has 
yet to recover.  The economic collapse and redistribut ion programs effectively caused an 
exodus of unemployed Black rural farm workers into urban areas seeking employment.  
As demand increased, “legal” housing became unaffordable and the number of houses in 
violation of local building laws grew dramatically.26   In addition, the informal business 
sector has been mushrooming because legitimate employment opportunities became 
unavailable.27  The U.N. Special Envoy reports that prior to the demolitions “3 to 4 
million Zimbabweans earned their living through informal sector employment, 
supporting another 5 million people, while the formal sector employed [] 1.3. million 
                                                 
18 Why Gono’s ‘Turnaround’ Strategy May Fail, ZIMB. STANDARD, Oct. 9, 2005 (Reporting that current 
inflation is at 264%, grossly up from the 8.49% inflation rate in 1985.); Lorna Davidson & Raj Purohit, The 
Zimbabwean Human Rights Crises: A Collaborative Approach to International Advocacy, 7 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 108, 115-116 (2005). 
19 A detailed analysis of the land reform program in Zimbabwe is beyond the scope of this paper.  For an 
in-depth analysis see Hasani Claxton, Land and Liberation: Lessons for the Creation of Effective Land 
Reform Policy in South Africa, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 529 (2003).  
20 Dancaescu, supra  note 16, at 619 (“700,000 black families lived on 16.2 million hectares, while 5,500 
white farmers had rights to . . . 15.6 million hectares.”). 
21 Claxton, supra  note 19, at 541.   
22 CIA World Factbook: Zimbabwe, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/zi.html#Econ (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2005) [hereinafter CIA World Factbook]. 
23 Claxton, supra  note 19, at 541. 
24 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 16. 
25 CIA World Factbook, supra  note 22 (Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war “drained hundreds of millions 
of dollars from the economy”). 
26 Human Rights Watch, supra  note 6, at 7. 
27 Id.; CIA World Factbook, supra  note 23. (The CIA reports an unemployment rate of 70% in Zimbabwe). 
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people.”28  Although the informal businesses “rarely pay[ed] taxes or fees in direct 
proportion to the services they use[d],” local authorities were collecting “substantial” 
revenues and fees from the informal activities.29 
¶7 In 1995, the government of Zimbabwe officially noted the illegal housing and 
informal business sector problem facing its urban areas in its initial State Party Report 
issued to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (“ESCR Committee”).30  
In response, the ESCR Committee made clear its concern “about the precarious situation 
of persons living in illegal structures or unauthorized housing,” but insisted that “persons 
should not be subjected to forced evictions unless . . . done under conditions compatible 
with the Covenant.”31  In disregard of the ESCR Committee’s response and threats of 
tightened sanctions from the United States, United Kingdom and European Union, 32 
government officials announced in the capital city of Harare on May 19, 2005 their 
intention to destroy unlicensed businesses and “illegal” housing structures.33   
¶8 The notice given by local city council members and police “rang[ed] from [no 
notice to] one or two days to a week”34 “to reorder the affairs which were put in place in a 
period of 20 years.”35 Thereafter, police and security forces bulldozed informal trading 
shops, housing structures, and arrested illegal traders beginning in Harare and extending 
throughout the country – demolishing legal housing and businesses, and killing at least 
six people in the process.36  The hundreds of thousands of evictees were loaded into 
trucks and shipped to transit camps that were inadequate to accommodate such large 
numbers of people.37   
B. Human Rights Abuses 
¶9 The Operation has further crippled Zimbabwe’s economy, as well as its social and 
political structures, but the most hard-felt impact has been the human rights abuses 
directly inflicted on its most vulnerable population – those already living in poverty and 
barely making a living from the informal business sector; HIV/AIDS patients left with no 
access to treatment; school aged children having their educations disrupted; and the 
elderly left homeless with no support.  As one victim of the Operation reported to an 
Australian news source: “’ZANU-PF has killed us’ . . . as he explains that his shop was 
destroyed in the demolitions, and now he’s supporting his family – including a disabled 
                                                 
28 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 17.  The U.N. Special Envoy also reports that the informal sector grew 
from 20% in 1986 to 40% by 2004. 
29 Id. at 22. 
30 Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Initial Report: 
Zimbabwe, sec. 100(i), U.N. Doc. E/1990/5/Add.28 (1995) [hereinafter Zimbabwe’s State Party Report] 
available at  http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.  These reports are the primary way the ESCR Committee 
monitors compliance to provisions of the CESCR.  State parties to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are required to send periodic reports to the ESCR Committee in 
accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the CESCR. 
31 Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Zimbabwe, para. 
13, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.12 (1997), available at  http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nef. 
32 See Baffour Ankomah, Zimbabwe: A nation of many surprises, NEW AFRICAN, Oct. 1, 2005, at 52.   
33 Human Rights Watch, supra  note 6, at 12. 
34 Id. 
35 Innocent Mawire, Clean-Up Violated Basic Human Rights, ZIMB. INDEPENDENT , July 31, 2005. 
36 Human Rights Watch, supra  note 6, at 13. 
37 Augustine Mukaro, Showdown Looms Over Human Rights, ZIMB. INDEPENDENT, Sept. 23, 2005. 
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daughter – on about $50 a month.”38  This man, however, is fortunate not to have had his 
home destroyed as “thousands of families were left unprotected in the open in the middle 
of Zimbabwe’s winter . . . [and] families [] removed to transit camps . . . had no shelter or 
cooking facilities and minimal food supplies, and sanitary facilities.”39   
¶10 Deriving their numbers from “official” governmental sources, the U.N. Special 
Envoy reported that 92,460 homes had been demolished, affecting 133,543 families, and 
totaling nearly 569,685 individuals being rendered homeless.40  The Envoy also reported 
that approximately 32,538 informal business structures were destroyed, leaving 97,614 
individuals unemployed.  These numbers do not include an estimated 2.56 million people 
“whose livelihoods are indirectly affected by, for example, loss of rental income and the 
disruption of highly integrated and complex networks involved in the supply chain of the 
informal economy.”41  Twenty percent of those directly affected are living with no shelter 
and have nowhere to go, another twenty percent have been forced into “transit camps” in 
rural areas, and the remaining sixty percent have either been taken in by friends or 
families, or have sought temporary accommodations with churches or other community 
shelters.42  It was reported from a Zimbabwean newspaper that those without shelter are 
staying in “mostly knee-high and unsightly makeshift structures made of . . . broken 
asbestos sheets, wood, dirty plastics and cardboard boxes.”43 
¶11 Since nearly a majority of those displaced are without alternative housing or 
assistance, the humanitarian crisis is substantial.  This includes “immediate need of tents, 
blankets, food, water, sanitation and medical assistance,”44 all of which humanitarian 
NGO’s have attempted to provide unsuccessfully due to bureaucratic hurdles and 
governmental interference.45  Exacerbating this difficulty is the fact that the government 
is moving the displaced to secluded rural areas without notifying humanitarian agencies, 
and when humanitarian aid does arrive the police are reported to have been forcibly 
preventing food and water distribution. 46  This is disturbing considering children have 
been seen feeding on rotten food left by vendors.47  In addition, the lack of sanitized 
water, coupled with a lack of medical care particularly within the transit camps, has led to 
water borne outbreaks of dysentery and cholera, and pneumonia and tuberculosis for 
those living without shelter.48  The U.N. Special Envoy has reported an emerging 
epidemic, “with reported deaths among displaced children due to respiratory 
infections.”49   
                                                 
38 Zoe Daniel, Mugabe Government faces possible split, AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP., Oct. 21, 2005. 
39 State Department Issues Background Note on Zimbabwe, U.S. FED. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2005. 
40 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 32. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 35.  One among many ironies stemming from the tragic demolition is that those who were 
employed by the informal sector, and who had gotten loans to build legitimate housing now have no means 
of repaying their loans. 
43 Walter Marwizi, Clean Up Victims Win Court Reprieve, ZIMB. STANDARD, Oct. 16, 2005. 
44 U.N. Report, supra note 2, at 36. 
45 U.S. Fed. News, supra  note 39;  Vusumuzi Sifile, SA Food Aid Bogged Down by Red Tape, ZIMB. 
STANDARD, Aug. 28, 2005. 
46 Barry Newhouse, Human Rights Group Says Zimbabwe Secretly Scattering Homeless, U.S FED. NEWS, 
Aug. 20, 2005. 
47 ZIMB. STANDARD, supra note 43.   
48 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 37-38.  
49 Id. at 38. 
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C. The International Response 
¶12 Although most Western powers, including the United States, United Kingdom and 
the European Union, have condemned the Operation, African states have not directly 
attacked Mugabe’s demolitions.50  This is largely due to the fact that many African 
leaders, including Nelson Mandela, view Mugabe “‘as a liberator of his nation in the 
long, bitter struggle on the continent in which so many . . . suffered so much.’”51  Despite 
the reluctance of neighboring states to condemn the Operation, the United States, 
European Union, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
have tightened “travel and economic sanctions on Mugabe, members of his Cabinet and 
his close allies in the armed forces and the judiciary,”52 further isolating Mugabe and 
Zimbabwe from the international community.  In the U.S., Representative Tom Lantos 
(D-CA), ranking member of the House International Relations Committee, introduced a 
bipartisan resolution condemning the Operation and its disregard for human rights, and 
called on the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to continue withholding benefits from 
Zimbabwe.53   
¶13 The sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by Western states were initially implemented 
following the land redistribution program, but have since been tightened to limit 
economic aid and relations “in the area of trade, free circulation of capital, and free 
circulation of persons.”54  Because the sanctions were largely targeted at Zimbabwean 
heads of state and not the Zimbabwean economy or its people, the governments of the 
U.S., U.K. and E.U. continue to provide food and medical aid to the compulsorily 
displaced residents through delivery to local NGOs.55   Additionally, in September 2005 
the IMF chose not to continue withholding benefits to Zimbabwe, as that would further 
affect its already destitute population. 56 
D. Zimbabwe’s Justification for the Operation 
¶14 The international community, humanitarian NGOs, and human rights lawyers 
interpret the government’s justification for the Operation as a “‘smokescreen’ . . . that 
had little to do with addressing the problem of informal structures and restoring order 
within urban areas.”57  These groups view the Operation as a reaction to the parliamentary 
elections in March 2005, where the Movement for Democratic Change (“MDC”) – 
ZANU-PF’s strongest political opposition – had a high turnout in urban areas.58  Yet even 
after the U.N. Special Envoy distributed its report, the government of Zimbabwe 
remained steadfast in declaring that “the risk to public health and morality, national 
                                                 
50 Human Rights Watch, supra  note 6, at 35. 
51 Nat Hentoff, Mugabe’s shameful apologist, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at A19. 
52 Tendai Farai, Zimbabwe on the Brink: Heart of Darkness, ADVERTISER (Austl.), July 16, 2005, at W07. 
53 Rep. Lantos Introduces Bill Condemning Zimbabwe’s Wanton Destruction of Private Property, U.S. FED. 
NEWS, July 29, 2005. 
54 Paola A. Pillitu, European ‘Sanctions’ Against Zimbabwe’s Head of State and Foreign Minister: A Blow 
to Personal Immunities of Senior State Officials? , 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST . 453 (2003). 
55 Sarah Williams, U.S. Envoy Affirms Solidarity with Zimbabwe’s Hungry, Homeless , U.S. FED. NEWS, 
Aug. 16, 2005. 
56 Ndimyake Mwakalyelye, IMF: Outlook ‘Bleak’ for Zimbabwe Without Major Policy Shifts, U.S. FED. 
NEWS, Oct. 4, 2005. 
57 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 20. 
58 Zoe Daniel, Mugabe Government faces possible split, AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP., Oct. 21, 2005.  
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security and the economy necessitated that the operation had to be undertaken without 
further delay.”59  That Mugabe’s own Finance Minister conceded the Operation was “a 
spontaneous exercise that had no budget,” was carried out in the face of international 
condemnation and in the midst of economic paralysis, lends much credence to the notion 
that it was a “deliberate attempt . . . to scatter opposition supporters into rural areas where 
they [could not] mobilize against [ZANU-PF] – especially when they’re starving and 
cold.”60   
II. TREATY-BASED PROTECTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY, HOUSING AND 
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FORCED EVICTIONS 
¶15 Because “human rights are correctly perceived as an instrument for the defense of 
the vulnerable . . . [whereas] property rights have often been perceived as an instrument 
to protect the rich and the powerful,”61 the human right to property has received mixed 
reception among human rights specialists.  Nonetheless, the right to adequate housing and 
protection from forced evictions has received near universal acceptance as a fundamental 
human right.  Until recently, however, developing and applying a universally accepted 
interpretation of these rights has been difficult, primarily because of the complexity of 
reconciling property rights with the progressive goals of U.N. human rights treaties. The 
obligations of states have therefore been unclear.62  Committees to the major U.N. 
conventions have since sought to clarify these rights by adopting specific interpretations, 
guidelines, and due process procedures, which are embodied in resolutions that state 
parties are obligated to follow before compulsory evictions may take place.  In addition, 
national and international jurisprudence continues to help clarify the guarantees of the 
right to adequate housing and protection from forced evictions as enshrined in the major 
U.N. and regional African human rights instruments.     
¶16 International conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party, and that recognize a right 
to adequate housing and protection from forced evictions, include, among others,63 the 
                                                 
59 NEW AFRICAN, supra  note 32. 
60 AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP., supra  note 58; Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property be 
Constitutionalized? A Relational and Comparative Approach , in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF 
THE 21ST CENTURY 471, 421 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds. 1996) (“Taking people’s property 
is an effective form of persecution, of undermining the power and efficacy of a group, of designating an 
individual or group as inferior and unprotected.”). 
61Banning, supra  note 1, at 7.   
62 Scott Leckie, The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Right to Adequate 
Housing: Towards an Appropriate Approach, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 522, 526 (1989).   
63 The right to adequate housing is also enshrined in other international conventions.  See Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1969) (accession 
by Zimb. May 13, 1991). Article 5(e) provides that “In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid 
down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all of its forms and to guarantee the right to everyone, without distinction as to race, 
colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following 
rights: . . . (e) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in particular . . . (iii) the right to housing.”; Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/34/180 (1980) (accession by Zimb. May 13, 1991).  Article 14(2) provides that “States Parties shall 
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, 
on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and benefit from rural development and, 
in particular, shall ensure to such women the right . . . (h) to enjoy adequate living conditions particularly in 
relation to housing, sanitation, electricity and water supply, transport and communications.”  U.N. 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1959, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”) 64; the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) 65; and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Charter”) 66.  The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)67 is also implicated, because it obliges 
state parties to respect an individual’s freedom of movement and prohibits arbitrary 
interference with an individual’s home.   
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
¶17 As the oldest promulgation of universal human rights, the Universal Declaration, 
adopted in 1948 by the U.N. General Assembly, sets forth the most widely accepted 
provisions protecting individuals’ human rights vis-à-vis their state.  The Universal 
Declaration is a non-binding resolution, but “although the declaration in itself may not be 
a legal document involving legal obligations . . .it contains an authoritative interpretation 
of the ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ which do constitute an obligation . . . 
binding upon the Members of the United Nations,”68 stemming from the U.N. Charter, 
and therefore enforceable by the U.N. Security Council.69  Furthermore, the provisions of 
the Universal Declaration have been interpreted as customary international law. 70  The 
right of private property ownership is extended in Article 17, which provides: “(1) 
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.  (2) 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”71   
¶18 On its face, Article 17 extends a universal right of each individual to the ownership 
of private property, but in the context of Zimbabwe its practical affect stops short for two 
reasons.  First, because “national laws [in Zimbabwe were] mostly ignored after 
independence, leading to [] rapid formation of backyard extensions now dubbed 
illegal,”72 there is a question as to whether technically “illegal” property comes under the 
protection of “the right to own property.”  This right, however, is not exclusive to real 
property, and proof of formal ownership was held by the European Court of Human 
Rights not to bar the right to protection of informally owned property. 73  Second, the right 
                                                                                                                                                 
16) 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).  Principle 4 stipulates that “[t]he child shall enjoy the benefits of social 
security . . . The child shall have the right to adequate nutrition, housing, recreation and medical services.” 
64 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), art. 17 [hereinafter 
Universal Declaration]. 
65 CESCR, supra note 4, at art. 11(1). 
66 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 14, 22(2), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter]. 
67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), at art. 12. 
68 H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : 
LAW POLITICS MORALS, 147, 151 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2000). 
69 See Egon Schwelb, An Instance of Enforcing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Action by the 
Security Council , 22 INT’L & COMP L.Q. 161 (1973).   
70 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (The Second Circuit recognized the 
Universal Declaration as customary international law in the context of freedom from torture, and noted that 
since 1977 “eighteen nations have incorporated the Universal Declaration into their own constitutions.”); 
Jonathan Shirley, The Role of International Human Rights and the Law of Diplomatic Protection in 
Resolving Zimbabwe’s Land Crisis, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP . L. REV. 161, 166 (2004). 
71 Universal Declaration, supra  note 64, art. 17. 
72 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 56. 
73 See Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301A Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994) (Interpreting Article I of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which guarantees the right to 
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not to be “arbitrarily deprived” of property is ill-defined in international law. 74  But one 
can presume that “arbitrary deprivation” would be defined as the failure of a state to give 
fair “notice and an opportunity to be heard”75 as the U.S. Supreme Court defined it in 
Fuentes v. Shevin.76  This is analogous to the ESCR Committee’s Comment No. 7 due 
process requirement that a state provide “genuine consultation with affected persons and 
groups”77 before depriving an individual of her property. 
¶19 If one adopts these interpretations of the “right to own property” and protection 
from “arbitrary deprivation” as applicable to the construction of Article 17, it is evident 
that the compulsory evictions contravened these rights.  Unable to afford “legal” housing, 
urban dwellers built “backyard extensions” onto existing “legal” plots and paid plot 
owners rent for their accommodations.78  This not only “proliferated as a form of 
affordable rental housing . . . [but provided] a source of income for [plot] owners.”79  
Under the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation, this would qualify as 
legitimate property ownership.  In addition, adequate notice and genuine consultation 
before the evictions took place were not provided to the evictees before the demolitions 
began. 80  For instance, where “notice” appeared in a local newspaper five days after 
demolitions began81 and “’consultations’ were undertaken because . . . people were 
informed . . . through their monthly bills, which included a fine levied on owners who 
had illegal structures,”82 an “arbitrary deprivation” of property was clearly carried out.  
B. The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
¶20 The obligation to respect and protect the right to housing exists in the CESCR and 
as a signatory Zimbabwe is bound by its provisions.83  The right to housing is found in 
Article 11(1), which states: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate food clothing and housing . . . .”84  The supervisory committee – ESCR 
                                                                                                                                                 
property, to not require proper title documents or proper compliance with legislation when a state 
threatened to evict or interfere with peaceful enjoyment of monasteries established in the 9th and 13th 
centuries.). 
74 Shirley, supra  note 70, at 166. 
75  407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). 
76 Id. 
77 General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (Art. 11.1): Forced evictions, Report of the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16th Sess., at para 8, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV 
(1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 7].  
78 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 25.   
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 58, 60. 
81 Human Rights Watch, supra  note 6, at 12. 
82 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 60. 
83 Zimbabwe acceded to the CESCR on May 13, 1991.  See Michael Dennis & David Stewart, Justiciability 
of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should there be an International Complaints Mechanism to 
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health? , 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 476 (2004) Unlike the 
ICCPR, the rights set forth in the CESCR “are not described as obligations to be performed by states parties 
in full and at once.  Rather, they represent goals to be achieved progressively,” as specified in Article 2(1).  
This is evident in the fact that the CESCR has no individual complaints mechanism that would make 
violations of specific rights justiciable. 
84 CESCR, supra  note 4, art. 11(1). 
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Committee85 – in its General Comments Nos. 3 and 9 outline states’ obligations under the 
CESCR, requiring each party to use “all means at its disposal to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the Covenant . . . [including its] legal and administrative systems.”86  For 
example, “a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of 
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of 
the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations 
under the Covenant.”87  Because in the context of Zimbabwe it is the agents of the state 
and not a third party infringing the rights of its citizens, “the right to an adequate standard 
of . . . housing” can be seen as a negative duty on the government of Zimbabwe to 
“respect” or “abstain from doing anything that violates the integrity of the individual or 
infringes on his/her recognized human rights . . .,”88 or put more simply, “duties to avoid 
depriving.”89   
¶21 Article 11(1) has been carefully defined and interpreted by the ESCR Committee in 
its General Comment No. 4.90  Comment No. 4 specifies four duties obligating states to 
prevent forced evictions.  These requirements include: (1) “all persons [must] possess a 
degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, 
harassment and other threats”91; (2) “demonstrat[ion] [through State Party Reports] that it 
has taken whatever steps are necessary, either alone or on the basis of international 
cooperation, to ascertain the full extent of . . . those living in ‘illegal’ settlements, [and] 
those subject to forced evictions and low-income groups”92; (3) the right to domestic legal 
remedies including “(a) legal appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or 
demolitions through the issuance of court-ordered injunctions; (b) legal procedures 
seeking compensation following an illegal eviction;”93 and (4) concludes with a 
declaration that “instances of forced eviction are prima facie incompatible with the 
requirements of the Covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional 
circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant principles of international law.”94  The 
“exceptional circumstances” include “persistent behavior which threatens, harasses or 
intimidates neighbors; persistent behavior which threatens public health or is manifestly 
criminal behavior as defined by law . . . and illegal occupation of property without 
compensation.”95 The government of Zimbabwe relies on these exceptions as justification 
for the evictions under international law. 96  
                                                 
85 The ESCR Committee “seeks to achieve three principal objectives: (1) developing the normative content 
of the rights recognized in the Covenant; (2) acting as a catalyst to state action in developing national 
‘benchmarks’ and devising appropriate mechanisms for establishing accountability, and providing means of 
vindication to aggrieved individuals and groups at the national level; and (3) holding states accountable at 
the international level through the examination of reports.” Steiner et al., supra  note 68, at 305. 
86 General Comment No. 9: The domestic application of the Covenant, Report of the U.N. Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19th Sess., at para. 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998). 
87 General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, para.1), Report of the U.N. 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 5th Sess., at para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990). 
88 Banning, supra  note 1, at 223. 
89 Id. 
90 General Comment No. 4, supra  note 8. 
91 Id. at para. 8(a). 
92 Id. at para. 13. 
93 Id. at para. 17. 
94 Id. at para. 18. 
95 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 59. 
96 Id. at 60. 
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¶22 While General Comment No. 4 provides “the most comprehensive international 
statement of law on the right to adequate housing to date,”97 Comment No. 7 responds 
directly to forced evictions and stipulates the procedures required by a state before and 
after it carries out compulsory evictions.98  Among those implicated are: 
(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) 
adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the 
scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the proposed evictions . . . 
[and] alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used, to be 
made available in reasonable time to all those affected; . . . (f) evictions 
not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless the affected 
persons consent otherwise; (g) provisions of legal remedies; and (h) 
provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to 
seek redress from the courts; [and] evictions should not result in 
individuals being rendered homeless or vulnerable to the violation of other 
human rights.99 
Even if these procedural requirements are satisfied, the evictions must be carried out in 
“strict compliance” with other provisions of the CESCR, and the policy initiative must be 
reasonable and proportionate in light of the harm caused.100 
¶23 The case for the compulsorily displaced lies in the argument that none of these 
procedural requirements have been complied with, and the policy initiative to clean up 
Zimbabwe’s cities does not outweigh the right to security from compulsory evictions 
when there was no infrastructure in place to accommodate the displaced.  As mentioned 
in the application of the Universal Declaration, the due process requirements of “genuine 
consultations” and fair notice were not affected prior to the evictions taking place, nor 
were the evictees provided with information on the proposed evictions.101   In addition, 
the Operation was carried out in the middle of Zimbabwe’s winter season, leaving 
families exposed to the weather with no alternative accommodations.102  But the most 
fundamental of these procedural violations is the fact that the Zimbabwean judiciary has 
been dismissive of complaints seeking injunctions prevent ing forced evictions and 
compensation for the destruction of homes and private property. 103  Though some 
homeless evictees have recently been granted a court order preventing their removal by 
the government from “transit camps” until adequate accommodations are provided, they 
still remain homeless with no alternative housing or basic services.104   
¶24 The government of Zimbabwe carried out the evictions without following any of 
the procedural requirements specified in the General Comments interpreting Article 
11(1), but most importantly did not adhere to its “duties to avoid depriving.”  However, 
because the ESCR Committee lacks “enforcement powers, leaving it primarily a doctrine 
                                                 
97 Mayra Gomez & Bret Thiele, Housing Rights are Human Rights, 32 HUM. RTS. 2, 3 (2005). 
98 General Comment No. 7, supra note 77. 
99 Id. at para. 15. 
100 Id. at para. 14. 
101 U.N. Report, supra  note 2, at 60. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 ZIMB. STANDARD, supra  note 43. 
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involved in data collection and recommendations,”105 it is unlikely that Article 11(1) 
violations can be rectified by the ESCR committee alone.  In an analogous case where the 
government of Nigeria undertook large scale forced evictions, for example, the ESCR 
Committee merely drafted its concluding observations,106 had them circulated in Nigeria 
by NGOs, issued a press release, put them on the U.N. website and included them in the 
Committee’s Annual Report; no additional actions were undertaken to compel Nigerian 
officials to adhere to its CESCR obligations.107  Because the ESCR Committee “has yet to 
show that it has the capability to appropriately and comprehensively [enforce] the right to 
adequate housing . . . [despite] the procedural changes adopted by the committee . . . 
[that] permit a legal determination of its contents,”108 it is left to the government of 
Zimbabwe to recognize its obligations under the CESCR.  This, however, is not feasible 
when the Zimbabwean judiciary has ceased to function independently. 109  
C. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
¶25 It is argued that the right to property ownership is civil and political, while “[t]he 
right to land for survival, the right to development, and the right to self-determination of 
oppressed people to natural resources are all social and economic rights.”110  Nonetheless, 
both civil and political, and social, economic and cultural rights are interdependent 
insofar as they both require states to realize “that every woman, man and child has the 
right to a secure place to live in peace and dignity, which includes the right not to be 
evicted unlawfully, arbitrarily or on a discriminatory basis from their home, land or 
community.”111  The ICCPR is significant in the context of Zimbabwe because it 
explicitly identifies in Article 2(3) the right to a remedy within a state party’s domestic 
legal framework, and allows individuals to bring a complaint against the state if it has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the U.N. Human Rights Committee by signing the Optional 
Protocol specified in Article 41.112  Zimbabwe acceded to the ICCPR on August 13, 1991.  
It has not, however, signed the first or second Optional Protocols and therefore does not 
                                                 
105 Dancaescu, supra  note 16, at 638; see also  Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints Mechanism to 
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health? , 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462 (2004). 
106 Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Nigeria,  U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.23 (1998), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nef. 
107 Steiner et al., supra  note 68, at 306. 
108 Leckie, supra  note 62, at 534. 
109 Dancaescu, supra  note 15, at 637 (“As is the case in Zimbabwe, when a judiciary ceases to function 
independently and no international civil or constitutional court exists, there is no oversight, other than that 
of a despot of a nation, to find a balance between the right to development and the right to security in 
property, unless the international community intervenes.”). 
110 John M. Nading, Property Under Siege: The Legality of Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 16 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 737, 786 (2002). 
111 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Resolution on the Prohibition of forced evictions, para. 3, U.N. 
Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV (2004), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-
RES-2004-28.doc [hereinafter Forced Evictions Resolution]. 
112 ICCPR, supra  note 67, at art. 2 para. 3(b) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes . . . To 
ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the 
legal system of the State, and to develop possibilities of judicial remedy.”). 
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“recognize the competence” of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider 
individual complaints.113 
¶26 The ICCPR addresses the right to be free from the deprivation of property in 
Article 17, which provides: “(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . (2) Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”114  The right to 
freedom of movement and “freedom to choose [a] residence” is extended in Article 12, 
with limited exceptions that “are provided by law, are necessary to protect national 
security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and 
are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.”115  In accordance 
with the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 27, the exceptions provided 
in Article 12(3) are to be interpreted narrowly, and “[t]he laws authorizing the application 
of restrictions . . . may not confer unfettered discretion on those charged with their 
execution.”116  
¶27 The Human Rights Committee has responded to the problem of forced evictions in 
a 2004 Resolution. 117  The Resolution recommends, inter alia, that “Governments [] 
provide immediate restitution, compensation and/or appropriate and sufficient alternative 
accommodation . . .to persons and communities that have been forcibly evicted, 
following mutually satisfactory negotiations with the affected persons or groups . . .,” and 
most importantly “that all Governments ensure that any eviction that is otherwise deemed 
lawful is carried out in a manner that does not violate any of the human rights of those 
evicted.”118  The Resolution, therefore, makes explicit the positive obligations of states 
parties to the ICCPR to provide due process, remedies, and prevention of further human 
rights abuses if the evictions are indeed “legal.”   
¶28 Zimbabwe did not fulfill its obligations under the ICCPR during the Operation.  
When armed Zimbabwean police “forced [the residents] to destroy their own houses, [] at 
gunpoint . . . [and] destroyed [the homes] by bulldozers . . . or burnt and razed [them] to 
the ground,”119 without restitution, compensation or alternative housing, it can safely be 
said that an “arbitrary or unlawful interference with [the residents’] privacy, family, [and] 
home” was carried out.  Further, by “compelling people to move to the rural areas against 
their wishes,”120 there was clearly a violation of the evictee’s right to the freedom of 
movement and choice of residence.  As mentioned, Article 2(3) requires that these 
victims receive “an effective remedy” from “competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities,”121 and because Zimbabwe acceded to the ICCPR before 1993, it is 
a self-executing treaty, and therefore requires a “competent” tribunal to remedy the 
                                                 
113 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Status of Ratifications of the 
Principal International Human Rights Treaties as of 09 June 2004, http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf; 
ICCPR, supra  note 67, at art. 41. 
114 Id. at art. 17. 
115 Id. at art. 12(1), (3).  
116 General Comment No. 27: Freedom of movement (Art. 12), Hum. Rts. Comm., 67th Sess., at para. 13, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999). 
117 Forced Evictions Resolution, supra  note 111. 
118 Id. at para. 4, 5. 
119 Human Rights Report, supra  note 6, at 2. 
120 Id. at 38. 
121 ICCPR, supra  note 67, at art. 2(3). 
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government’s human rights violations resulting from the Operation. 122  The victims are 
therefore entitled to an effective remedy.   
D. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
¶29 The African Charter stands as a regional human rights instrument that is concurrent 
with the U.N.’s promulgation of universal human rights specified in the Universal 
Declaration, CESCR, and the ICCPR.  The African Charter was adopted by the 
Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) in 1986 and ratified by Zimbabwe that same 
year.123  Article 30 established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“African Commission”),124 which unlike the ESCR Committee, functions as a quasi-
adjudicatory body that hears individual and state party complaints with the goal of 
“seek[ing] an amicable settlement between the parties.”125 However, in 1998 the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU adopted a Protocol to the 
African Charter, entering into force on January 2004, which established an African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Court”).126  Although the African Court and 
African Commission’s general responsibilities “appear to be in competition with each 
other,” the African Court will hear “disputes ‘concerning the interpretation and 
application’ of the Charter, Protocol, and any other relevant human rights instrument 
ratified by the States concerned.”127  As of now, however, the African Court is not yet 
fully operational. 
¶30 The African Charter addresses the right to property in Article 14, which states: 
“[t]he right to property shall be guaranteed.  It may only be encroached upon in the 
interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with 
the provisions of appropriate laws.”128  Article 14 is peculiar, however, because it 
subordinates the “guarantee” of property rights to national law in the second clause, and 
thereby “permits states, in their nearly unrestrained discretion, to restrict the rights 
guaranteed by the Charter.”129  Furthermore, the “right to property” is ill-defined in the 
African Charter and there are no provisions that specifically protect against forced 
evictions.  Although displaced victims may bring a “communication” to the African 
Commission to seek redress for other human rights violations resulting from the forced 
                                                 
122 Zimb. Const. § 111B(2).  International human rights treaties acceded to before 1993 do not require 
parliamentary approval, and are therefore self-executing. 
123 Shirley, supra  note 70, at 167. 
124 African Charter, supra  note 66, at art 30.  Article 30 created the African Commission to be established 
within the OAU, with the role of “promot[ing] human and peoples’ rights and [to] ensure their protection in 
Africa.” 
125 Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Individual Complaints Procedures of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : LAW 
POLITICS MORALS 926 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2000). 
126 African Commission, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court_en.html; for an in-depth explanation of the Court and its 
procedures see Association for the Prevention of Torture, The African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Jan. 2000), http://www.apt.ch/africa/African%20Court.pdf.  
127 Steiner et al., supra  note 68, at 936. 
128 African Charter, supra  note 66, at art. 14. 
129 Shirley, supra  note 70, at 168. 
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evictions, until the African Court is operative, the African Charter affords very little 
protection for the property rights of the compulsorily displaced.130 
III. DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
¶31 The Bangalore Principles, adopted in 1988 at a colloquium by Commonwealth 
jurists from around the world in Bangalore, India, provide judicial standards and methods 
by which a state may, through practical means, incorporate its international human rights 
obligations into its domestic legal framework.131  The Principles would ideally be the 
starting point for any discussion on the domestic enforceability of international treaty 
obligations.  However, two fundamental prerequisites must be satisfied before the 
methods specified in the Principles can be realized.  First, the executive and legislative 
branches must abstain from coercing or threatening a state’s judiciary and its political 
autonomy.  Second, a state’s judiciary must function independently from the executive 
and legislative branches.  As discussed more fully below, Zimbabwean officials continue 
to experience coercive action by the executive and a lack of judicial independence.  
Therefore, the Principles are of little practical use to the situation in Zimbabwe. 
¶32 The only reference to international law in relation to municipal law in the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe (“Constitution”) is found in Section 111B, which provides that 
“any convention, treaty or agreement acceded to, concluded or executed . . . shall not 
form part of the law of Zimbabwe unless it has been incorporated into the law by or 
under an Act of Parliament.”132  This provision was an amendment to Section 111B and 
therefore applies only to the conventions Zimbabwe entered into after 1993.133  It is well 
established that “a party [to a binding treaty] may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,” as specified in article 27 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.134 Thus, by signing the CESCR, ICCPR, 
and the African Charter, the fact that section 111B renders treaties non-self-executing “in 
no way reduces or significantly postpones [Zimbabwe’s] legal obligations”135 specified 
therein.   
¶33 Though customary international law is not mentioned in the Constitution, the High 
Court of Zimbabwe has ruled, prior to the amendment of section 111B, that “international 
human rights norms will become part of [Zimbabwe’s] domestic human rights law.”136 
Despite that immediately following Zimbabwe’s independence the government 
progressively acceded to U.N. and regional human rights instruments, and courts and 
                                                 
130 Banning, supra  note 1, at 61-62  (“The article is . . . not sufficiently clear as to the circumstances under 
which the right [to property] may be restricted . . . In practice, confiscations do occur in Africa on a 
substantial scale with little recourse to justice.”). 
131 A discussion of The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct can be found in Michael Kirby, The Role 
of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to International Human Rights Norms, 62 AUSTL. 
L.J. 514, 531-32 (1988); The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Bangalore_principles.pdf [hereinafter 
Bangalore Principles]. 
132 Zimb. Const. 111B(1)(b), amended by Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 12) Act, 1993, § 
12(1). 
133 Id. 
134 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
135 Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 425 (1989). 
136 A Juvenile v. The State (1990) 4 S.A. 151, 155 (Zimb.). 
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legislatures were “free to adopt the international law rule even if doing so would [have] 
invalidate[d] a provision of domestic legislation,”137 this has ceased to be the case.  
Mugabe’s regime has continually shown “disdain for the rule of law where it runs counter 
to his aims,” by actions such as “pack[ing] the [High Court] with party faithfuls” when 
Mugabe felt that justices ruling in line with internationally accepted practices conflict 
with his policy initiatives.138  This presents a difficult challenge for advancing an 
international human right to adequate housing and prevention of forced evictions within 
Zimbabwe’s domestic legal framework.  The following section will address the argument 
for the incorporation of international obligations into Zimbabwe’s domestic legal 
framework and the practical difficulties when the judiciary has ceased to function 
independently. 
A. Treaty Obligations as a Basis of Customary International Law 
¶34 It is accepted customary international law that a state party to a binding multilateral 
treaty is obligated to make domestic changes necessary to fulfill its international 
obligations, including its incorporation into municipal law. 139  This rule of customary 
international law has been accepted in the United States and elsewhere, and is the 
underlying tenant of the Bangalore Principles.  For instance, in an interpretation of a U.N. 
Charter provision describing the trusteeship system, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. U.S. Dep. Of Interior,140 noted that 
The extent to which an international agreement establishes affirmative and 
judicially enforceable obligations without implementing legislation must 
be determined in each case by reference to many contextual factors: the 
purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the existence of 
domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct 
implementation, the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement 
methods, and the immediate and long-range social consequences of self- 
or non-self-execution. 141 
Although this is a default doctrine applied to the question of whether a treaty is self-
executing in the U.S., failure by “competent” authorities in Zimbabwe to adopt similar 
reasoning as an exception to the Constitution’s non-self-execution clause would deprive 
the compulsorily evicted residents of the internationally recognized human right to 
adequate housing and prohibition of forced evictions, thereby undermining the purpose of 
“promot[ing] universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” as envisioned by the Universal Declaration. 142 
                                                 
137 Michael G. Bochenek, Compensation for Human Rights Abuses in Zimbabwe, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 483, 548 n 133 (1993). 
138 Nading, supra  note 110, at 788-89. 
139 Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on Human Rights: A Theoretical 
Framework , 35 U. Tol. L. Rev. 219, 221 (1985); see Bangalore Principles, supra  note 131 at para. 3. 
140 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974). 
141 Id. at 97 (citing M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967)). 
142 Universal Declaration, supra  note 64, at para. 5. 
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¶35 Further, it has been contended that all of the rights enumerated in the Universal 
Declaration, including Article 17(2)’s prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of property, 
“has ‘the attributes of jus cogens.’”143  Though arguably “an overly enthusiastic 
assertion,”144 the Universal Declaration and other binding human rights conventions have 
been used numerous times to interpret national statutes in cases giving rise to human 
rights violations in the U.S. and elsewhere; evincing widespread and representative 
participation in the agreement[s].’”145  Despite courts in Zimbabwe being “asked to . . . 
‘uphold and to enforce discriminatory laws: at one time to be an instrument of justice and 
at another to be an instrument of oppression’,”146 the Universal Declaration, CESCR, and 
the ICCPR should provide “competent” tribunals clear guidance in the face of oppressive 
or discriminatory laws and actions by state officials.  Provisions of the CESCR and 
ICCPR are not only legally binding international law for member states, but as a matter 
of customary international law, the Zimbabwean parliament and courts must utilize these 
instruments “to determine [the] context and reach of rights guaranteed by domestic 
law.”147   
¶36 There is one fundamental prerequisite before this “infusionist” approach can be 
used to inform domestic legislation and interpret constitutional provisions to be 
concurrent with international human rights law, as specified in the Bangalore 
Principles.148  This is the requirement of an independent judiciary that is not coerced by 
the executive and that is willing to supplement municipal law and statutory interpretation 
with international human rights law. 149  Although Zimbabwean courts were once able to 
“refer to international human rights norms in order to give flesh to domestic legal 
provisions,”150 since 2000 “activist” judges and those exhibiting independence from 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF have been removed, forced to resign, physically assaulted, and 
arrested.151   
¶37 This not only makes it impossible for victims of the Operation to bring a direct 
cause of action against responsible officials under justiciable guarantees in the 
Constitution  – particularly the “Protection from deprivation of property” of Section 16152 
– but also impedes any hope of a Zimbabwean court applying international human rights 
standards so that the Constitution and domestic laws conform to Zimbabwe’s obligations 
                                                 
143 Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 
367, 395 (1985). 
144 Id. 
145 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations 
in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449, 491, 513 n.205.  
146 Enoch Dumbutshena (former Chief Justice of Zimbabwe), Role of the Judge in Advancing Human 
Rights, 18 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1298 (1992) (quoting an address by Mr. Arthur Chaskalson, National 
Director, Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg, at a Bar Dinner in Harare, April 1989). 
147 Lillich, supra  note 143, at 408.    
148 Bochenek, supra  note 137, at 515. 
149 Id. at 524. 
150 Id. at 519 (quoting Geoffrey Feltoe, Towards a Stronger Human Rights Culture in Zimbabwe: The 
Special Role of Lawyers, 7-8 ZIMB. L. REV. 134 (1989-90).). 
151 Davidson et al., supra  note 19, at 118; Heather Boyle, The Land Problem: What Does the Future Hold 
for South Africa’s Reform Program? , 11 IND. INT’L  & COMP . L. REV. 665, 690-92 (2001).  This began as a 
result of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which allowed the government to take white-owned farm land 
without compensation.  Courts began holding that this was illegal under the Constitution and ordered 
squatters to leave.  Coercive measures were then taken by Mugabe to curtail such judicial “activism.”     
152 Zimb. Const. ch. III, § 16.   
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 292
under international law.  This is particularly the case when an issue involves a 
governmental policy or ruling favoring the MDC; as one High Court Justice was detained 
without food, clothing and medication after holding a government official in contempt for 
not adhering to a court order, while another was beaten after ruling in favor of MDC 
members.153  Moreover, as discussed below, Section 16(a)(ii) of the Constitution gives an 
extremely broad exception to government acquisition of property, rendering the 
“protection from deprivation of property” mostly symbolic.154  Under present 
circumstances, it is doubtful any Zimbabwean Justice would uphold the rule of law at the 
expense of his life and freedom, no matter the extent of human rights abuses involved. 
IV.  ZIMBABWE’S DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
¶38 The Zimbabwean common law system comes from South Africa, which is derived 
from Roman civil law and Dutch common law, and influenced by English common 
law. 155  Judges in Zimbabwe ideally observe the doctrine of stare decisis and apply the 
law on a case-by-case basis.156  When interpreting the Constitution, particularly the 
Declaration of Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe generally gives high regard to 
decisions of other Commonwealth courts, including Australia, Canada, India, and the 
United States.157  The Constitution of Zimbabwe was entered into force shortly after 
independence from Britain on April 18, 1980.  The Declaration of Rights, found in 
Chapter III of the Constitution, was largely taken from the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms158 and provides for the protection from 
governmental interference with property in Section 16.  Both Section 16 and the Regional 
Town and Country Planning Act of 1976 extend procedural safeguards, but still “[n]o law 
exists in Zimbabwe that prohibits arbitrary evictions [per se] and grants a measure of 
protection of tenure to the persons who could be affected.”159   
¶39 It is commonly recognized in Roman-Dutch law that a person who is unlawfully 
deprived of his property must be restored to his previous position, and the act of 
dispossession or spoliation by government officials in an unlawful manner – against the 
will of the possessor – gives the dispossessed the right to a remedy. 160  Therefore, “[s]tate 
officials who cause squatters to surrender shacks under duress, commit acts of 
spoliation,” but only “where the ‘spoilator’ was authorized by the Court or by statute to 
dispossess the applicant”161 who seeks a remedy.  Section 16, “Protection from 
Deprivation of Property,” is consistent with this Roman-Dutch black letter law insofar as 
it protects “property of any description or interest or right . . . [from being] compulsorily 
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acquired”162 by the government without adherence to certain procedural safeguards.  
Section 16(a)(i)-(ii), however, subordinates the protection from compulsory acquisition 
by providing very broad exceptions, which would be adequate authorization “by statute” 
under Roman-Dutch law to legally dispossess those informally housed.163   
¶40 The most far-reaching exception is found in Section 16(a)(ii), which states that: 
in the case of any property, including land, or any interest or right therein, 
that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interest of defense, 
public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and 
country planning or the utilization of that or any other property for a 
purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section of the public.164 
¶41 Because Mugabe has couched the Operation in terms of preventing illegal activity, 
restoring order in urban areas, and preventing “disorderly urbanization,” the compulsory 
acquisitions fit squarely within the “public safety, public order, public morality, public 
health” exceptions.  These exceptions, however, are qualified by the conjunctive term 
“and” with a list of procedural requirements, indicating that even if an exception applies, 
the acquiring authority must satisfy the procedural requirements.  These include 
reasonable notice to any person affected by the acquisition, and fair compensation within 
a reasonable time after acquiring the property.  If the acquisition is contested, the 
acquiring authority must apply to the High Court for an order confirming the acquisition, 
and if an order is denied, it requires the return of the property.  Finally, if the acquiring 
authority has not complied with the procedures, subsection (f) creates a right of action for 
the dispossessed.165   
¶42  Part V of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act (“Planning Act”) extends 
additional due process safeguards in the case of compulsory acquisitions.166  Section 34 
requires authorities to issue a “prohibition order” giving thirty days notice before the 
acquisitions take place, so that those “who [have] erected the unlawful structure[s] [have] 
an opportunity to make presentations, and also [have] time to take steps to either 
regularize their position or find an alternative place to reside . . . .”167  The “prohibition 
order” was issued in no other city except Harare on May 24, 2005, while the demolitions 
began on May 19, 2005.168  In no instance did an evictee have an opportunity to 
“regularize” their structure, as notice was given as little as a few hours before the 
demolitions began, and some owners of homes and business who complied with the law 
also had their structures destroyed.169  
¶43 A feat of judicial activism in the face of arbitrary mass forced evictions, which may 
provide guidance to the Zimbabwe judiciary, was evidenced by the Supreme Court of 
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India’s decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation.170  In Olga Tellis, the 
Supreme Court of India overruled a statute that gave local officials the right to forcibly 
evict urban dwellers occupying public property without due process safeguards.  Unlike 
the present context, however, India’s constitution does not include an explicit right to 
property, and the Court therefore broadly interpreted the right to life to include the right 
to housing.  The Court found that to compulsorily evict “pavement dwellers” would 
deprive them of their means of livelihood because of the proximity of the dwellings to 
their place of employment.  While the government argued that it was justified because of 
the hazards of public safety and health, the Court remained resolute in declaring that if 
you “[d]eprive a person of his right to livelihood [] you shall have deprived him of his 
life,” and therefore “if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be 
deprived of their livelihood.”171 
¶44  In Zimbabwe, the Constitution explicitly guarantees the right of its citizens to be 
protected from arbitrary deprivation of property.  Yet in the process of implementing the 
forced evictions, the government disregarded all of its own constitutional and statutory 
protections from compulsory displacement, with absolutely no check by the judiciary.  
Practically speaking, this renders Section 16 of the Constitution and Part V of the 
Planning Act largely null and void, and reinforces the argument that “Zimbabwe is a 
classic case of an authoritarian government clinging to power and using whatever 
methods it considers necessary to ensure its continued survival.”172  When parliament and 
the executive can simply bypass the judiciary in implementing any policy initiative it 
considers “beneficial to the public generally,” then international intervention is necessary 
to reinforce the rule of law and prevent further harm by government officials. 
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 
¶45 Some scholars argue that the push for the “rule of law” by the human rights 
movement – particularly within the U.S. – through funneling money to NGOs and using 
military force to curtail human rights violations have been unsuccessful, as evidenced by 
the occupations in  Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 173  It is critical for the realization 
of universally recognized human rights that they be judicially enforceable rather than 
hopeful aspirations.  International intervention is requisite when a state continually 
evinces that it will not uphold its own law, much less comply with its international 
obligations.  In the case of Zimbabwe, such intervention is absolutely critical, and its 
continued violations of international human rights obligations concern the entire 
international community.   
¶46 The report of the United Nations secretary-general’s High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change proposes such intervention and responds to the fact that the 
decision-making of intergovernmental enforcement mechanisms are not “divorced” from 
the decisions of its members.174  The High-Level Panel recommends international 
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intervention through humanitarian aid, monitoring missions, diplomatic pressure, and 
military force as a last resort when a state’s authorities are unable or unwilling to protect 
its civilians.175  The underlying premise is that “all signatories of the UN Charter accept a 
responsibility both to protect their own citizens and to meet their international obligations 
to their fellow nations.”176  This does not mean merely that a state must have a right to 
intervene, “but [that it has a] ‘responsibility to protect’ . . . when it comes to people 
suffering from avoidable catastrophe – mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by 
forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease.”177  The 
idea implies that participation in the U.N. itself requires member states to intervene when 
the “responsibility to protect” is implicated and not fulfilled, despite whether member 
states favor non- intervention or not.178   
¶47 Though intervention requires evidence of a threat to international peace and 
security, non-intervention yields to the responsibility to protect also when there are 
breaches of international law. 179  With direct evidence that the Operation has caused 
starvation, disease outbreaks, and deaths reported by the U.N. Special Envoy, the 
“serious violation[s] of international humanitarian law”180  per se justify international 
response and intervention.  This argument was endorsed by the High-Level Panel, as it 
noted that “sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent” 181 
serious violations of international human rights law.   
¶48 It is evident from the analysis in section III that the government of Zimbabwe has 
violated the right to adequate housing and prohibition of forced evictions without due 
process specified in the Universal Declaration, the CESCR, and the ICCPR, and its 
unwillingness to accommodate the displaced has subjected its citizens to further human 
rights violations.  Moreover, the Human Rights and ESCR Commissions have been 
largely ineffective in enforcing member states’ treaty obligations.  It is therefore 
imperative that the U.N. give teeth to its human rights provisions by compelling member 
states to take action and enforce compliance in Zimbabwe. 
¶49 In addition, because 570,000 individuals have been rendered homeless182 without 
adequate shelter, food, clean water, or health care as a direct result of the actions of their 
own government, the “responsibility to protect” is clearly implicated.  Though the 
government has attempted to respond to the humanitarian crises it created by launching 
“Operation Gerikai” – reconstruction and rebuilding – by giving plots of land to the 
displaced so they may build new homes, “the scale of the problem is too large and 
exceeds the present ability of the Government to address the basic needs of those affected 
by Operation Restore Order.”183  Indeed, with 2.4 million people in need of food aid,184 
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“chronic budget deficits, a strained fiscal base and hyperinflation[,] observers are critical 
about whether Operation Garikai will materialize.”185  Consistent with the High-Level 
Panel’s recommendations, the U.N. “must now subordinate state security for human 
security,”186 and urge member states to intervene in Zimbabwe so that the victims of the 
Operation can seek redress and protection from a government that is wholly apathetic to 
their suffering.   
VI. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
¶50 The unplanned and chaotic execution of Operation Murambastvina has caused 
avoidable and untold human suffering for more than half a million of Zimbabwe’s most 
vulnerable population.  In such a crisis, it is difficult to determine the most effective 
means of reconciliation.  Though international human rights law recognizes the right of 
individuals to protection from the arbitrary deprivation of property by their state, the 
enforcement mechanisms are completely ineffective when a government is unwilling to 
adhere to its international obligations.  Coupled with the failure of Zimbabwe’s domestic 
legal system, and the inability of the judiciary to apply the law without succumbing to 
intimidation by Mugabe and ZANU-PF, there are few alternatives other than some 
substantial form of international intervention.   
¶51 Sustainable and coherent strategies to immediately remedy the housing problem are 
available with the help of the international community.  These would include: (1) 
“rewrit[ing] building codes and zoning regulations to standards attainable by low-income 
groups”; (2) providing “inexpensive building materials, common components, fixtures 
and fittings” in support of “Operation Garikai”; (3) urban planning that would utilize 
underdeveloped and vacant land to “secure available housing sites as legal alternatives to 
squatter settlements (as Managua, Nicaragua and Several Tunisian cities have done), [that 
would] ensure sufficient space for recreation and good connections to employment or 
income for lower- income groups”; and finally (4) “chang[ing] finance systems so that 
inexpensive loans are available to low-income and community groups without unrealistic 
demands for collateral.”187  In addition, the implementation of a truth and reconciliation 
commission to remedy the systematic abuses inflicted on the citizens of Zimbabwe by 
their government is another possibility. 188   
¶52 Indeed, redressing the abuses stemming from the Operation through international 
intervention by implementing some of these strategies is only the first step in preventing 
future human rights abuses by Mugabe and ZANU-PF.  Zimbabwean decision-makers 
have proven not only irresponsible in setting a sustainable fiscal course for the country, 
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but have shown complete disregard for the well-being of their citizens during the 
implementation of every state sponsored policy initiative since Zimbabwe’s 
independence.  Operation Murambatsvina and the subsequent nonfeasance on the part of 
government officials must be the last time the international community stands aside while 
the government of Zimbabwe inflicts mass suffering on its citizens.189  Operation 
Murambatsvina and the subsequent nonfeasance on the part of government officials must 
be the last time the international community stands aside while the government of 
Zimbabwe inflicts mass suffering on its citizens.190 
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